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In this article the authors argue that the existing adversarial trial process often prevents the stories of sexual
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repeated and leading questions, in a manner that is confrontational and often accusatory, is probably the worst
way to get her story heard accurately in court. It is likely to unfairly undermine her credibility and to result in
unjustified acquittals or in prosecutors deciding not to pursue a case. The article examines the challenges
posed by traditional methods of cross-examination for witnesses with cognitive, developmental, or intellectual
disabilities that affect their ability to recall, process, and communicate information, suggesting that existing
Criminal Code accommodations are inadequate to address these concerns. Cross-examination should be
conducted in a way that respects both the right of the accused to a fair trial and the complainant’s right to sex
equality. Relying on developments in other jurisdictions, the authors recommend adopting a system of victim
support persons or intermediaries, which would allow witnesses with mental disabilities to have assistance in
understanding questions and in communicating their evidence to the court as fully as possible. Judges should
also be given explicit legislative authority to intervene to disallow questions that are inappropriate based on
the particular witness’s abilities. Such accommodations facilitate rather than impede the truth-seeking
function of a trial and are not inconsistent with the fair trial rights of the accused.
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Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for
Witnesses with Mental Disabilities in
Sexual Assault Cases
JANINE BENEDET * & ISABEL GRANT **
In this article the authors argue that the existing adversarial trial process often prevents the
stories of sexual assault complainants with mental disabilities from being heard in court. Relying
on social science evidence, the authors argue that subjecting a woman with a mental disability
to a rigorous cross-examination with repeated and leading questions, in a manner that is
confrontational and often accusatory, is probably the worst way to get her story heard accurately
in court. It is likely to unfairly undermine her credibility and to result in unjustified acquittals
or in prosecutors deciding not to pursue a case. The article examines the challenges posed by
traditional methods of cross-examination for witnesses with cognitive, developmental, or
intellectual disabilities that affect their ability to recall, process, and communicate information,
suggesting that existing Criminal Code accommodations are inadequate to address these
concerns. Cross-examination should be conducted in a way that respects both the right of
the accused to a fair trial and the complainant’s right to sex equality. Relying on developments
in other jurisdictions, the authors recommend adopting a system of victim support persons
or intermediaries, which would allow witnesses with mental disabilities to have assistance in
understanding questions and in communicating their evidence to the court as fully as possible.
Judges should also be given explicit legislative authority to intervene to disallow questions that
are inappropriate based on the particular witness’s abilities. Such accommodations facilitate
rather than impede the truth-seeking function of a trial and are not inconsistent with the fair
trial rights of the accused.
Dans cet article, les auteurs font valoir que le processus contradictoire actuel des procès fait
en sorte que la version des plaignantes d’agression sexuelle atteintes de déficience mentale
n’est souvent pas entendue par le tribunal. En se fondant sur l’enseignement des sciences
sociales, les auteurs allèguent que le fait d’astreindre une femme atteinte de déficience
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mentale à un contre interrogatoire rigoureux comportant des questions insistantes et
suggestives, de façon conflictuelle et souvent accusatoire, est sans doute le pire moyen pour
faire entendre sa version exacte devant le tribunal. Cela entachera probablement sa crédibilité
de manière inéquitable et entraînera des acquittements injustifiés, ou fera en sorte que les
procureurs décideront de ne pas donner suite à ce cas. Cet article se penche sur les défis
que posent les méthodes traditionnelles de contre interrogatoire des témoins atteints de
déficiences cognitives, développementales ou intellectuelles qui affectent leur capacité de se
rappeler, traiter et communiquer des renseignements, et suggère que les dispositions
actuelles du Code criminel sont inadéquates pour aborder ces problèmes. Le contre interrogatoire devrait être mené d’une façon qui respecte le droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable et le
droit de la plaignante à l’égalité des sexes. En se fondant sur de nouvelles méthodes utilisées
ailleurs, les auteurs recommandent d’adopter un système faisant appel à des intermédiaires
capables de venir en aide aux victimes, ce qui permettrait aux témoins souffrant de déficience
mentale de mieux comprendre les questions et de communiquer de la manière la plus
complète possible leur témoignage au tribunal. On devrait également légiférer spécifiquement
pour accorder aux juges l’autorité de rejeter les questions inappropriées en raison des
capacités intellectuelles du témoin. Plutôt que lui faire obstacle, de telles dispositions
favoriseraient la recherche de la vérité, sans pour autant être incompatibles avec le droit de
l’accusé à un procès équitable.
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Mentally disabled victims do not fare well in our verbally based adversarial processes that
demands [sic] mental agility, a good memory, quick responses, and a facility to readily
employ a rich vocabulary to accurately describe or slyly obfuscate truth.1
WOMEN WHO ARE VICTIMS of sexual assault must overcome a number of serious

hurdles before a charge of sexual assault is approved. They must deal with the
physical and emotional trauma of the assault; they must be interviewed by police,
sometimes multiple times; and they are often subject to an intrusive physical

1.

R v Gadway (1993), 21 WCB (2d) 383, YJ No 69 at para 42 (Terr Ct) (QL).
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examination. Police and prosecutors decide whether their story is unfounded2
and whether there is a likelihood of conviction sufficient to warrant proceeding
with the charge.3
For women with mental disabilities these challenges are magnified.4 While
recognizing that this is not a homogenous group of women, we can say that
women with mental disabilities may require various kinds of assistance to have
full access to police services and services offered to victims of sexual assault. They
may have difficulties remembering and communicating what has happened to
them.5 The person who assaulted them is often a caregiver or other person in a
position of trust.6 In a more limited number of cases, they may not understand
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Sexual assault complaints continue to be declared unfounded at a higher rate than other
charges, despite an absence of evidence that they are, in fact, more likely to be fabricated. See
Holly Johnson, “Limits of a criminal justice response: Trends in police and court processing
of sexual assault” in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault Law Practice and Activism in a
Post-Jane Doe Era (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012); UK, Home Office Research,
A gap or a chasm? Attrition in reported rape cases (Research Study 293) by Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett
& Linda Regan (London: Home Office, 2005); Australia, Victoria, Statewide Steering
Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault, Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000-2003
(Summary Research Report) by Melanie Heenan & Suellen Murray (Melbourne: Office of
Women’s Policy, July 2006).
The policies and standards on this charge screening vary from province to province. In
Ontario, prosecutors must proceed if there is a reasonable prospect of conviction. In British
Columbia, the standard is higher: a reasonable likelihood of conviction and whether a
prosecution is required in the public interest. Minister of Attorney General, Province of
Ontario, “Charge Screening” in Crown Policy Manual, 21 March 2005, online: <http://
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/2005/ChargeScreening.pdf>; Criminal
Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General, Province of British Columbia, “Charge
Assessment Guidelines” in Crown Counsel Policy Manual, 2 October 2009, online: <http://
www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/pdf/CHA1-ChargeAssessmentGuidelines2Oct2009.pdf>.
As in our past work in this area, we use the term “mental disability” to refer collectively to
intellectual, developmental, and psychiatric disabilities that result in cognitive impairment
affecting comprehension, communication, or learning. Such disabilities may be present from
birth or acquired through illness or accident. We recognize that this is an extremely diverse
group of women and that the term “mental disability” is not used by any of these groups as
a descriptor. We use it as a collective reference because it is the term used in section 15(1) of
the Charter, which guarantees equality without discrimination on the basis of sex and mental
or physical disability among its listed grounds. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11,
s 15(1) [Charter].
R v Harper, 2002 YKSC 18, YJ no 38 [Harper]; R v Parrott, 2001 SCC 3, [2001] 1 SCR
178 (QL).
See Dick Sobsey, Violence and Abuse in the Lives of People With Disabilities: The End of
Silent Acceptance? (Baltimore: Paul H Brookes, 1994) at 75-79.
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that what has been done to them is a criminal offence, or they may not understand
the nature and consequences of sexual activity.7
If a woman with a mental disability can navigate the system to the point at
which charges are laid, her challenges continue. Women with mental disabilities
are subjected to sexual assault at a considerably higher rate than other women.8
One would expect, therefore, that the criminal-justice system would have developed
means to ensure that this group of complainants could have their stories heard
and acknowledged in court. In fact, these are among the hardest sexual assaults
to prosecute, and the system itself erects barriers to women with mental disabilities
accessing the criminal justice system. Complainants are expected to have fully
functioning memories, to be able to answer detailed questions about minute
7.
8.

See R v McPherson (1999), WL 556 (BCSC). For further discussion, see Michelle McCarthy,
Sexuality and Women with Learning Disabilities (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1999) at 120-201.
It is difficult to find current empirical studies on the incidence of sexual assault against
women with mental disabilities as many rely on the 1990s work cited here. See e.g. Erin
Barger et al, “Sexual Assault Prevention for Women With Intellectual Disabilities: A Critical
Review of the Evidence” (2009) 47:4 Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities 249. The
leading studies from the 1990s include Roeher Institute, No More Victims: A Manual to Guide
Counselors and Social Workers In Addressing the Sexual Abuse of People with a Mental Handicap
(North York: Roeher Institute, 1992) at 25; Roeher Institute, Harm’s Way: The Many Faces
of Violence and Abuse Against Persons with Disabilities (North York: Roeher Institute, 1995)
at 9; Sobsey, supra note 6 at 69; McCarthy, supra note 7 at 29-30. However, more recent
work shows that the incidence of sexual assault against women with mental disabilities
is significantly higher than the incidence against women without this label. See Sandra L
Martin et al, “Physical and Sexual Assault of Women with Disabilities” (2006) 12:9 Violence
Against Women 823 at 829. In their North Carolina study, Martin et al found that the
incidence of sexual assault against women with cognitive disabilities was approximately three
times that of women without disabilities. Some studies do not distinguish between mental
and physical disability. For example, in a Canadian study, persons with disabilities were
generally found to be three times more likely to be subjected to sexual violence at the hands
of their intimate partners. See Douglas A Brownridge “Partner Violence Against Women
With Disabilities: Prevalence, Risk, and Explanations” (2006) 12:9 Violence Against Women
805. Brownridge also found that the difference in rates of violence between women with
disabilities and those without has increased since the late 1990s (ibid at 812). The General
Social Survey on victimization conducted by Statistics Canada excludes respondents living
in institutions, thereby excluding some people with mental disabilities. It also combines
mental and physical disabilities. The most recent report from the Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics also finds, based on this data, that persons with disabilities report sexual assault at
a rate of more than twice that of respondents without disabilities. See Canada, Canadian
Centre for Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization and Health: A Profile of Victimization
Among Persons with Activity Limitations or Other Health Problems, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
2009) at 8. While the definition of persons with “activity limitations” included those with
mental disabilities, the exclusion of persons in institutions suggests that this number is
artificially low.
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details of the offence (often phrased in complex language), and, perhaps most
importantly, to be able to stand up to a robust cross-examination, which may
include leading questions, allegations of falsification, and repeated questioning
likely to confuse any witness.
We have argued elsewhere that the criminal justice system in Canada was
not designed with the needs and interests of this group of witnesses in mind.9
We have contended that, given the high rate of sexual assault faced by women
with mental disabilities, they should be considered paradigmatic rather than
exceptional victims. In this article we build on these premises by considering
existing discriminatory barriers that prevent the evidence of these women from
being fully heard in court. In particular, we consider the challenges posed by
traditional methods of cross-examination for witnesses with cognitive, developmental,
or intellectual disabilities that affect their ability to recall, process, and communicate
information. We describe the kinds of accommodations currently available for
these witnesses and examine whether they ought to be expanded or modified to
better respond to these concerns.10 We also examine some of the subtler and more
pervasive barriers to complainants with mental disabilities, focusing on the process
of examining a witness and, particularly, subjecting her to cross-examination.
One of our goals is to reconsider whether cross-examination, thought to be at
the heart of the adversarial system, can be conducted in a way that respects both
the right of the accused to a fair trial and the complainant’s right to sex equality.
In this article, we argue that current practices distort rather than facilitate
the truth-seeking function of a trial for this group of witnesses. Subjecting a
woman with a mental disability to a rigorous cross-examination with repeated
and leading questions, in a manner that is confrontational and often accusatory,
is probably the worst way to get her story heard in court. It is likely to unfairly
undermine her credibility and to result in unjustified acquittals, or to result in
prosecutors deciding not to pursue a case knowing that the complainant could
not withstand these practices. Even direct examination can fail to fairly bring out
9.

Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with
Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ” (2007) 52:2 McGill LJ 243
[Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ”].
10. There is also the very real possibility that a witness with mental disabilities will not be
permitted to testify at all, because he or she is considered to be incapable of testifying,
whether under oath or on a promise to tell the truth. We consider this question briefly
below in Part I, and in more detail in a forthcoming article, “More Than An Empty Gesture:
Enabling Women with Mental Disabilities to Testify On a Promise to Tell the Truth” (2013)
CJWL [Benedet & Grant, “More Than an Empty Gesture”].
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the complainant’s story if the questioning is not conducted with the necessary
attention to the complainant’s particular abilities.
The Criminal Code (the Code)11 provides some accommodations that are
designed to make the process less traumatic for a complainant with a mental
disability rather than to facilitate the actual questioning process itself. Few
accommodations go to the heart of what makes these cases so difficult to prosecute,
namely our legal system’s assumptions about the truth-seeking function of a trial
and how it is best accomplished. We examine these existing accommodations
and conclude that, while they are important, they do not speak to the problems
we have identified. We suggest that victim-support persons, sometimes called
intermediaries, be used as a matter of course, and that they be allowed to assist
the witness in understanding the questions posed and in communicating her
answers. This would be an important step towards meaningful support for this
group of witnesses. We also suggest that judges be given explicit legislative
authority to intervene to disallow questions that are inappropriate based on the
particular witness’s abilities. However, we will also argue that the attitudes about
the credibility and the sexuality of women with mental disabilities must also be
changed in order to truly allow this group of witnesses to have their stories heard
fully in court.
A Note on Gender
While our work focuses on women, who make up the large majority of sexual-assault
victims, many of our concerns about the criminal trial apply in similar fashion to
men with mental disabilities who complain of sexual assault and who are called as
witnesses by the Crown.12 We have not excluded these cases and, where we speak
generally of “witnesses” with mental disabilities, our analysis applies to both male
and female victims. We focus on women with mental disabilities because
there are particular gendered assumptions about sexual assault that intersect
with the general systemic deficiencies in cases involving complainants with
mental disabilities.13
11. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Code].
12. Indeed, one can infer that accused persons who have mental disabilities and who decide to
take the stand in their own defence may experience some of the same challenges. This subject
is beyond the scope of this article but deserves further attention. This article suggests that
enhancing support for all witnesses with mental disabilities may benefit the criminal trial
process as a whole.
13. A recent report by Statistics Canada indicates that 97 per cent of accused persons in
sexual assault crimes are male, while rates of sexual victimization range from 4 to 5.6
times greater for females than for males. Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics,
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The myths and stereotypes that have been applied to women’s complaints of
sexual assault are well-documented in case law and scholarship.14 These attitudes
have led some to blame women for their own victimization,15 to distinguish victims
according to their perceived chastity (measured along racial lines, among other
factors),16 and to construct scripts for how a ‘real’ rape victim would behave
that may bear little relation to actual victim behaviour.17 ‘Real’ rape has been
understood to involve a stranger who uses overwhelming force to subdue his
struggling victim. Sexual assaults between acquaintances or intimates that involve
the consumption of alcohol or drugs or that involve delayed disclosure risk
being considered unfounded or less serious.18 Underlying these myths is the

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.

Sexual Assault in Canada 2004 and 2007 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2008) at 11-12. See
also Statistics Canada, “The nature of sexual offences,” online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/
pub/85f0033m/2008019/findings-resultats/nature-eng.htm>. Thus in this paper, when
discussing sexual assault specifically, we utilize language that reflects the gendered reality of
sexual assault, referring to the accused as “he” and the complainant as “she.”
R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 83 DLR (4th) 193 [Seaboyer]; Elizabeth A Sheehy,
“Causation, Common Sense, and the Common Law: Replacing Unexamined Assumptions
with What We Know About Male Violence Against Women or from Jane Doe to Bonnie
Mooney” (2006) 17:1 CJWL 87; Elizabeth Sheehy, “From Women’s Duty to Resist to Men’s
Duty to Ask: How Far Have We Come?” (2000) 20:3 Can Woman Stud 98.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé makes this point generally about sexual assault against girls and
young women in R v L(DO), [1993] 4 SCR 419 at para 29, 88 Man R (2d) 241 [L(DO)].
William H George & Lorraine J Martinez, “Victim Blaming in Rape: Effects of Victim and
Perpetrator Race, Type of Rape, and Participant Racism” (2002) 26:2 Psychol Of Women
Q 110; Roxanne A Donovan, “To Blame or Not To Blame: Influences of Target Race and
Observer Sex on Rape Blame Attribution” (2007) 22:6 J Interpers Violence 722; Regina A
Schuller & Marc A Klippenstine, “The Impact of Complainant Sexual History Evidence on
Jurors’ Decisions: Considerations From a Psychological Perspective” (2004) 10:3 Psychol,
Pub Pol’y & L 321.
See e.g. R v JAA, 2011 SCC 17, [2011] 1 SCR 628; R v Butts, 2012 ONCA 24 at para
24, 91 CR (6th) 424 (finding relevant evidence that complainant had consensual sex with
someone two hours after the alleged sexual assault). See also Lise Gotell, “Rethinking
Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky
Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron LR 865.
For example, in February 2011, a Manitoba judge on the Court of Queen’s Bench handed
down an unusually lenient sentence for a conviction of sexual assault, noting that the
female victim was wearing a tube top with no bra and lots of makeup and saying she sent
signals that “sex was in the air.” R v Rhodes, 2011 MBCA 98, 98 WCB (2d) 329. See media
coverage in, for instance, Mike McIntyre, “‘No woman asks to be raped’: Victim slams
judge’s decision,” National Post (25 February 2011), online: <http://news.nationalpost.
com/2011/02/25/no-woman-asks-to-be-raped-victim-slams-judges-decision/>. For evidence
of this tendency in the context of marital sexual assault, see Ruthy Lazar “Negotiating Sex:
The Legal Construction of Consent in Cases of Wife Rape in Ontario, Canada” (2010)
22:2 CJWL 329. For evidence of similar reasoning in applications for exemption from sex

8

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

persistent belief that women falsify complaints of sexual assault out of spite,
fantasy, or shame.19
While many of these myths have been recognized as such by courts and
commentators,20 this does not mean that their influence over collective consciousness
has been erased in the span of a few decades.21 In particular, merely being told that
these are stereotypes may do little to dislodge these myths if they are not replaced
by credible contrary information about victim behaviour and the prevalence of
sexual assaults in various settings.
Women with mental disabilities are affected by these myths and stereotypes
in ways that are sex-specific. We have written elsewhere that the history of public
policy responses to what was usually called “mental retardation” has been one
in which women with mental disabilities have simultaneously been treated as
asexual, in that they have been denied sexual health information and discouraged
from sexual activity, and as hypersexual, in that they are understood as motivated by animal instincts and eager for indiscriminate sexual contact.22 The myth of
hypersexuality is particularly potent in the sexual assault context, as it can be used
to portray the victim as the true sexual aggressor.23 More subtly, there can be a belief
that women with mental disabilities are ‘lucky’ when a man displays sexual interest
in them and that they ought to be grateful for that attention.24 This conclusion

19.

20.
21.

22.
23.

24.

offender registration, see Janine Benedet, “A Victim-Centred Evaluation of the Federal Sex
Offender Registry” (2012) 37:2 Queen’s LJ 437.
See, for instance, Dickson J’s (as he then was) comments in R v Pappajohn, [1980] 2 SCR
120 at 149, 111 DLR (3d) 1. Also see Philip NS Rumney, “False Allegations of Rape” (2006)
65:1 Cambridge LJ 125 (noting influence of false allegation claims on evidentiary rules and
unreliability of measurements of false allegations).
See Heureux-Dubé J’s comments in Seaboyer, supra note 14 at 649-56, 659-61.
Eliana Suarez & Tahany M Gadalla, “Stop Blaming the Victim: A Meta-Analysis on Rape
Myths” (2010) 25:11 J Interpers Violence 2010 (considering demographic factors associated
with rape myth acceptance); Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and ‘Ideal
Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397.
Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief,” supra note 9.
For example, in R v Alsadi the trial judge acquitted the accused on the basis that a civilly
committed woman with a mental disability had initiated the sexual activity with the accused,
a uniformed security guard in the hospital. The British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered
a new trial on the basis of errors made by the trial judge with respect to whether the accused
abused a position of trust or authority. 2012 BCCA 183, [2012] BCJ No 826 (QL) [Alsadi].
Personal conversation with Delphine Raymond, Collectif Feministe Contre Le Viol,
31 October 2011. See also Sherene Razack, “From Consent to Responsibility, from
Pity to Respect: Subtexts in Cases of Sexual Violence Involving Girls and Women with
Developmental Disabilities” (1994) 19:4 Law & Soc Inquiry 891; Carol A Howland &
Diana H Rintala, “Dating Behaviors of Women with Physical Disabilities” (2001) 19:1
Sexuality and Disability 41.
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may be even stronger where the woman has other characteristics that make her
less ‘attractive’ in conventional terms, such as obesity or physical disabilities.25
Other gendered assumptions apply with respect to male victims, who are
also typically targeted by male abusers.26 In particular, we recognize that sexual assaults against male victims are also acts of gendered violence that raise
different stereotypes affecting the assessment of the witness on the stand. Most
sexual assaults against men are committed by other men in a social context of
homophobia where it is not automatically assumed that the complainant must
have consented to the same-sex sexual activity. While this may sometimes work
to the benefit of the male complainant’s credibility, the assumption that a
non-consenting victim will show vigorous physical resistance may be stronger for
male victims than for women.27
People of both sexes with mental disabilities also face other stereotypes
affecting credibility. It is often assumed that they cannot distinguish fact from
fiction,28 that they are more likely to make up stories around sexual assault, 29 or
that they are more likely to lie because they do not appreciate the solemnity and
consequences of judicial proceedings.30 These assumptions take on a gendered
dimension because of historical attitudes that treated women as less credible
than men, and sexually active women as further diminished in credibility.31

25. Sarah M Buel, “Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay” (1999) 28:10
Colorado Lawyer 19 at 21-22.
26. Michael Scarce, Male on Male Rape: The Hidden Toll Of Stigma and Shame (New York:
Insight Books, 1997); Philip NS Rumney & Natalia Hanley, “The mythology of male
rape: Social attitudes and law enforcement,” in Clare McGlynn & Vanessa E Munro, eds,
Rethinking Rape Law: National, International and Comparative Perspectives (New York:
Routledge, 2010) 294; Catherine A MacKinnon, Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
96–568, Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner (1997) 8:1 UCLA Women’s LJ 9.
27. See e.g. R v RJS (1994), 123 Nfld & PEIR 317, 25 WCB (2d) 275 (PEISC).
28. See, for example, the reference to confusing truth with “wishful thinking” by the dissent of
Justice Binnie in R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5 at para 145, 280 CCC (3d) 127 [DAI], rev’g 2010
ONCA 133, 73 CR (6th) 50.
29. R v Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 SCR 788, rev’g 2007 QCCA 287, 75 WCB (2d)
657 [Dinardo].
30. R v Farley (1995), 23 OR (3d) 445 (CA), 40 CR (4th) 190 [Farley]; R v Lanthier, 36 WCB
(2d) 189, [1997] OJ No 4238 (Ct J).
31. Kathy Mack, “Continuing Barriers to Women’s Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on
the Proof Process” (1993) 4:2 Crim LF 327; Rosemary C Hunter, “Gender in Evidence:
Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms” (1996) 19 Harv Women’s LJ 127; Ann Althouse,
“The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook”
(1994) 88:3 Nw UL Rev 914; Christine Boyle, “Reasonable doubt in credibility contests:
sexual assault and sexual equality” (2009) 13:4 Int’l J Evidence and Proof 269 at 284-91.
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Thus women with mental disabilities who complain of sexual assault face an
especially difficult challenge.

I. CROSS-EXAMINATION AS A SYSTEMIC BARRIER
What is it that makes sexual assault cases involving witnesses with mental disabilities
particularly hard to prosecute successfully? We contend, in particular, that the experience of cross-examination as presently permitted deters valid complaints from being
made, causes prosecutors not to proceed with cases that are otherwise sound, and
results in unjustified acquittals. None of the accommodations presently available
to complainants is meant to be responsive to these problems.
A common law criminal trial seeks to uncover the truth about a series of
events within the complex structures that the legal system has developed to ensure
a fair trial. In the context of sexual assault prosecutions where the complainant
has a mental disability, we argue that the importance of truth seeking can be
obscured by our unquestioning adherence to rules that may in fact hinder rather
than facilitate the pursuit of truth. We are not suggesting that aggressive crossexamination of sexual assault complainants is only a problem for complainants with
mental disabilities, but rather that the problem is particularly acute for women
who have cognitive limitations that are easy for defence counsel to exploit.
There is no doubt that cross-examination is seen as a fundamental part of our
common law adversarial system. Historically speaking, the right to cross-examine,
along with many other facets of common law criminal justice systems, developed
in pursuit of a fair trial process that would make meaningful the presumption
of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Karen
Muller and Mark Tait32 summarize the traditionally accepted purposes of
cross-examination as follows:
The purposes of cross-examination are twofold: Firstly, to elicit information that is
favourable to the party conducting the cross-examination. Secondly, to cast doubt
upon the accuracy of the evidence given in chief by the witness. This would mean
that in the course of cross-examination only questions concerning facts relevant to
the issue or to the witness’s credibility may be asked.33
There is a fundamental belief that cross-examination, and the techniques employed
in it, are tools for discovering the truth and assessing credibility. According to Wigmore,

32. David Carson, “Regulating the Cross-Examination of Children” (delivered at the BS&L
Network Conference, 2 April 1995) at 4, cited in Karen Muller & Mark Tait, “The Child
Witness and the Accused’s Right to Cross-Examination” (1997) J South African L 519 at 520.
33. Muller & Tait, ibid at 519.
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it is “The greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth” and leaves
not a moment’s doubt in the mind of any lawyer as to its effectiveness … .34

Yet the idea that cross-examination as currently understood is fundamental
to a fair trial is often accepted as true without adequate scrutiny. In particular,
endorsements of the power of cross-examination rarely distinguish between
contradictions that reveal the truth and those that obscure it. A witness may make
a mistake or get confused on cross-examination, but this does not necessarily mean
she is lying.35 As David Carson explains, this witness may simply “be very poor at
being a witness rather than … a truth-teller.”36 The court is not actually assisted
in its truth-finding role when lawyers rely upon questioning techniques that
demonstrate only that a particular witness is fallible under cross-examination.
Muller and Tait further argue that cross-examination can impede the truthseeking function:
Cross-examination is often regarded as a feature of an adversarial system which
enables it to claim superiority over the inquisitorial system. However, adherents of
the latter system have often accused the adversarial system of giving an “exaggerated
efficiency” to the right of questioning. They argue that cross-examination bends and
distorts the evidence by means of suggestive questions and that justice cannot prevail
in an atmosphere where witnesses are influenced and badgered.37

There is a parallel here with the problem of false confessions by accused
persons that are at the heart of many of our wrongful convictions. It was once
widely assumed that no suspect would falsely implicate him or herself in a
serious crime. Yet we now know that police tactics like pretending to have found
damning evidence of guilt, or repeatedly questioning the suspect for many hours
without respite, may produce exactly such a confession—one that impedes rather
than assists in getting at the ‘truth.’ This may be particularly true where the goal
of the interrogation is to get a confession rather than to gather useful evidence.
In a similar fashion, it is quite possible that witnesses will falsely contradict
themselves out of confusion, fatigue, or fear under cross-examination, and this
possibility is heightened where the witness has a cognitive or intellectual disability.
In this article, we do not consider cases in which there is a challenge by
the defence to the competence of the complainant to give evidence in court.38
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Ibid at 520.
Ibid.
Ibid.
François Gorphe, La Critique du Témoinage (Paris: Dalloz, 1927) at 90, cited in ibid at 521.
We consider this problem in detail in a forthcoming article. “More Than An Empty Gesture,”
supra note 10.
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We note, however, that this remains a possibility in sexual assault cases involving
complainants with mental disabilities. Until recently, the questioning on the voir
dire could itself be problematic for complainants, who were faced with abstract
questions about the meaning of “truth” and “promises” or inquiries into their
religious education.39 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently addressed this
issue in R v DAI,40 where a majority held that a competency inquiry should
determine only whether the witness can communicate the evidence and whether
she can make a promise to tell the truth. It is thus no longer acceptable to ask
the witness questions about her ability to understand the promise or about her
understanding of the meaning of truth and lies. However, the precise contours
of what questions will be acceptable will need further clarification after DAI.41
In the following Part of this article we demonstrate that our traditional
methods of cross-examination may be contrary to the truth-seeking function of
the criminal trial, particularly for witnesses with mental disabilities. We begin
by summarizing the social science evidence on the subject, which suggests that
cross-examination serves to obfuscate rather than elucidate the truth for many
witnesses with mental disabilities. We then move on to illustrate some of these
problems by examining sexual assault prosecutions involving complainants with
mental disabilities.

II. SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF WITNESSES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
The available social science literature supports the view that witnesses with mental
disabilities are able to give accurate, useful, and truthful evidence that furthers
the truth-seeking process, but that their ability to do so is greatly hindered by
current practices of cross-examination. Of course, this is a very heterogeneous
group of complainants, and it would be wrong to assume that every complainant,
regardless of her disability, has precisely the same difficulties or needs precisely
the same accommodation.42 It is also important to note that the various social
39. This was done at the competency hearing held in DAI. Supra note 28 at para 84.
40. Ibid.
41. For example, we argue that it is not acceptable after DAI to ask a witness: “If I said my
sweater is red (when it is in fact blue) would I be lying?” Rather, we will suggest in a
forthcoming article that the proper question is: “Is my sweater red?” The latter question
sufficiently tests the complainant’s ability to communicate facts and her ability to disagree
with the questioner about the colour of the sweater. See Benedet & Grant, “More Than an
Empty Gesture,” supra note 10.
42. Louise Ellison, “The mosaic art?: cross-examination and the vulnerable witness” (2001) 21:3
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science studies involve different populations and use different language to describe
the group studied; thus it is difficult to generalize from any one study to persons
with mental disabilities across the board.43 However, some findings are consistent
enough that it is possible to draw some generalizations from the literature that
allow us to challenge some of our existing practices.
We know that some witnesses with mental disabilities may have “broad
deficits in memory encoding, storage and retrieval.”44 Some witnesses will only
have trouble with long-term memory, while others will have difficulty even with
short-term memory.45 We also know that most witnesses with intellectual disabilities
do best with questions that are open ended rather than closed.46 For example, a
witness with an intellectual disability might respond better to a question like
“tell us what happened on the day of the picnic” than to a question like “what
colour was the accused’s shirt on the day of the picnic?” In fact, when given openended questions, witnesses with intellectual disabilities have a high accuracy rate,
although they may not give as much information as witnesses without disabilities.47
Mark R. Kebbell et al described the reasons witnesses with intellectual disabilities
typically do better with open-ended questions:
The influence of question type can be understood in terms of the different cognitive
and social demands of different question formats. For more open questions, the
task is to tell the interviewer what the witness can remember relying on their own
memory. For more specific, closed questions, the task changes to one of providing
the interviewer with what he or she wants the witness to remember that the witness
may not be able to recall. As witnesses with intellectual disabilities spontaneously recall
fewer details concerning events, it is unsurprising that they provide less accurate
answers to specific questions and tend to confabulate.48

Leading questions can be particularly problematic. Studies have shown that
this occurs because persons with certain intellectual disabilities are more suggestible and may try to please the questioner more than other witnesses. There may also
be a tendency for a witness with a mental disability to answer “yes” to a question
LS 353 at 354-55.
43. Depending on when and where the study was conducted, some of that language is no longer
considered appropriate to describe people with disabilities. For the purposes of accuracy, in
describing the studies, we use the language of the authors in the studies.
44. Mark R Kebbell, Christopher Hatton & Shane D Johnson, “Witnesses with intellectual
disabilities in court: What questions are asked and what influence do they have?” (2004) 9:1
Legal & Criminological Psychology 23 at 23 [Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson].
45. Harper, supra note 5.
46. Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44.
47. Ibid at 24.
48. Ibid [citations omitted].

14

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

when the question is not understood. This may be due to the witness’s cognitive
ability, a desire to please the interviewer,49 or because persons with intellectual
disabilities may be quite skilled at giving the impression that they understand a
question by agreeing with the questioner.50 Some data suggest that when a question
is repeated, a person with an intellectual disability will be more likely to change
her answer on the basis that the questioner must have asked again because he or
she did not like the first answer.51 Persons with disabilities may also have learned
that acquiescing makes sense if they believe that authority figures are more likely
than they are to know the right answer.52
The manipulation of language may lie at the heart of cross-examination.
However, as Louise Ellison notes:
Language has been identified as the ‘primary manipulative tool’ at the disposal of
lawyers in court. In the context of cross-examination, it is a tool often abused to gain
advantage over immature and comparably unsophisticated language users.53

Thus witnesses whose disabilities interfere with their capacity to comprehend and
manipulate language are at a stark disadvantage in the criminal justice process.
The use of complex language and questions may be particularly confusing on
cross-examination, which often evolves “on the fly” as the answers are received.
Kebbell et al summarize their findings on this topic:
... [C]hildren and adults from the general population were much less accurate when
questions were asked using the kind of language favoured by lawyers (e.g. negatives,
double-negatives, and multi-part questions) than when asked questions in everyday
language. Negatives are questions that involve the word ‘not’ (e.g. ‘Did the man not
tell you to be quiet?’). Double-negatives involve the word ‘not’ twice (e.g. ‘Did John
not say that he would not go to the shops?’) Multi-part questions involve two or
more parts that have different answers (e.g. ‘At eleven o’ clock were you in the bar?
Was John at the garage?’). Experimental evidence shows that children and adults
frequently give ‘don’t know’ or incorrect responses to over-complex questions even
though they know the answer to the question if it is phrased simply. In non-court
situations, these factors appear to be particularly problematic for people with
intellectual disabilities.54
49. Carol K Sigelman et al, “When in Doubt Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews with Mentally
Retarded Persons” (1981) 19:2 Mental Retardation 53.
50. Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44 at 32.
51. Ellison, supra note 42 at 362.
52. Ibid at 359.
53. Ibid at 354-55 [citations omitted].
54. Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44 at 25 [citations omitted]. Kebbell et al explain
that “[c]onfabulation involves replacing gaps in memory with distorted or fabricated
material. Suggestibility is providing the answer believed to be required by the questioner,
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Nancy W. Perry et al also found that the closed questions typical of crossexamination may decrease the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in general, and
that this tendency was especially pronounced in the case of eyewitnesses with
intellectual disabilities. Further, individuals with intellectual disabilities may be
especially vulnerable to the heavily suggestive leading questions (for instance, “He
went to the bathroom after he got a coffee, yes?”) often used in cross-examination.
The increased suggestibility of witnesses with intellectual disabilities can be
unjustly used to argue that they are lying or have an unreliable memory when
in fact it may mean that different types of questions are better suited to trigger
a memory and that some types of details (such as dates and times) are less likely
to be remembered.55 When a witness hesitates or expresses confusion, this can be
misinterpreted as a lack of honesty or credibility, even when the details that cannot
be recalled are not important to the allegations at issue.
Cross-examination involves a high level of leading questions for all witnesses,
not just those with mental disabilities.56 However, Kebbell et al found that witnesses
with mental disabilities were more likely to be asked questions repeatedly, which
the authors hypothesize may be due to an attempt to exploit suggestibility or
merely because the witness did not appear to understand.57 A witness with a
mental disability may also be less likely to provide additional information58 or ask
for clarification if they do not understand the question.
The authors discuss the implications of these findings for witnesses with
intellectual disabilities:
Witnesses with intellectual disabilities were significantly more likely than general
population witnesses to agree with the force of a leading question, less likely to
disagree with the force of the question, and less likely to provide additional
information, particularly in cross-examination. Lawyers are likely to deliberately
exploit the characteristics of leading questions. As Evans (1995) points out in his
trial manual, leading questions are a powerful tool – both because they allow the
lawyer to formulate events as he or she sees them, and because they constrain the witness
to reply in a certain way. The implication of these results is that cross examination as

55.
56.
57.
58.

which may involve simple compliance with the questioner’s demands or incorporation of
the suggestion into recollection. Acquiescence concerns the fact that people are more likely
to say ‘yes’ than ‘no’ to questions which require a yes or no response.” “People with learning
disabilities as witnesses in court: What questions should lawyers ask?” (2001) 29:3 British
Journal of Learning Disabilities 98 at 99 [citations omitted].
Nancy W Perry et al, “When Lawyers Question Children: Is Justice Served?” (1995) 19:6
Law & Human Behavior 609, as cited in Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson supra note 44.
Ibid at 30.
Ibid.
Ibid at 32.
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currently practised is particularly likely to lead to inaccurate testimony from witnesses with intellectual disabilities.59

It may be that witnesses with mental disabilities are more suggestible only
when they do not understand a particular question or know the answer to it. At
least one study has found that they may be as steadfast as other witnesses when
they are sure about their answers.60 The authors conclude that new approaches
are needed to facilitate the process of questioning witnesses with disabilities, as is
education for lawyers and judges on these issues.
Strategically-framed questions are not the only means by which defence lawyers
assert control over a witness in cross-examination. Other commonly used tactics
can also be intimidating to witnesses:
Vigorous objection, warnings, reminders, repetition of questions and the insistence of proper answers are all devices used to attain and maintain editorial control.
These preventative techniques are not only ‘abrupt, frustrating and degrading to
the witness’, but they also dramatically reduce scope for clarification, explanation
and elucidation. There is, for example, no provision, as in everyday conversations,
for a witness ‘to express their concerns, their possible lack of comprehension about
the questions, or to negotiate in any way the content or direction of the line of
questioning.’61

Given these difficulties with cross-examination in general and certain types
of questions in particular, one might expect that judges would intervene to assist
witnesses with mental disabilities by requiring lawyers to simplify their questions
for such witnesses or at least to avoid very complex syntax, double negatives, and
the like. In fact, one English study found otherwise. The authors had hypothesized
that judicial intervention would be higher for witnesses with learning disabilities
than for other witnesses.62 As the authors explain:

59. Ibid.
60. Mark Kebbell & Chris Hatton, “People With Mental Retardation as Witnesses in Court: A
Review” (1999) 37:3 Mental Retardation 179.
61. Mark Brennan & Roslin E Brennan, Strange Language – child victims under cross examination
(Wagga Wagga: Riverina Murray Institute of Higher Education, 1988), cited in Ellison, supra
note 42 at 359-60.
62. Catriona ME O’Kelly et al, “Judicial intervention in court cases involving witnesses with
and without learning disabilities” (2003) 8:2 Legal & Criminological Psychology 229.
However, the authors concluded, there were “no significant differences in the number of
interventions made by the judge with witnesses depending on whether the witness had
learning disabilities or was from the general population … .” This is perhaps surprising,
given the generally poorer cognitive, memory, and linguistic skills of people with learning
disabilities (ibid at 237).
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Potentially, the judge can have a tremendous impact on lawyers’ questioning styles
and, consequently, witness accuracy. The function of controlling the trial is largely a
matter of judicial discretion. In this respect, judges should act as impartial “umpires”
and have the discretion to be flexible enough to tailor their power to individual
cases. Judges are obliged to have regard both to the need to ensure a fair trial for
the defendant and to the reasonable interests of other parties to the court process,
including witnesses.63

Contrary to expectations, the authors found no difference in the rate of
intervention by judges for witnesses with intellectual disabilities as compared to
other witnesses. Judges did not intervene any more often to assist witnesses with
intellectual disabilities in making sure they understood the question or how they
could reply; the same was true of interventions to call for breaks or to require
lawyers to simplify their questions.64 The study also concluded that lawyers were
not changing their type of questioning for witnesses with intellectual disabilities;
rather they just continued their usual practices without any accommodation.65
We are not suggesting that cross-examination is always problematic nor that
direct examination never is. An unprepared Crown counsel or one who has not
made efforts to understand the abilities of a particular complainant may also
create confusion by using the wrong types of questions or overly complex linguistic
devices. Similarly, in theory, defence counsel could be sensitive to the needs and
abilities of the complainant, although this appears to be more challenging in
practice given that cross-examination is more likely than examination-in-chief to
involve leading, negative, and closed questioning and that defence counsel will
have less familiarity with the complainant.66 The point is that all participants in
the process—including Crown counsel, defence counsel, and judge—must be
attuned to the needs and abilities of the witness.
This social science evidence should at least give us pause about relying on the
traditional methods of cross-examination for complainants with mental disabilities.
If we really are trying to get at the truth, we should be asking questions that
facilitate that objective rather than interfere with it. The right to cross-examination
surely does not extend to the right to take advantage of vulnerable witnesses’
difficulties. The purpose of cross-examination should be to test and challenge the
veracity of evidence, not to confuse and badger the witness into saying things that
conflict with what he or she may have said in direct examination.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Ibid at 230 [citations omitted].
Ibid at 237.
Ibid at 230. See also Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44 at 30.
Ibid at 25, 32.
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III. THE CASE LAW—SOME EXAMPLES
The case law provides examples of sexual assault cases in which cross-examination
and even direct examination appear to confuse the complainant and lead to
doubts about her testimony that may not have been warranted. In this Part,
we provide four examples of cases in which the complainant appeared confused
about the questions being asked and where her credibility was undermined or
challenged as a result. These examples demonstrate that these questions can
create difficulties through cross-examination, direct-examination, and even
when appellate courts try to give meaning to apparent problems in a witness’s
testimony. Our fourth example, drawn from New Zealand, demonstrates how
clear intervention by a trial judge can mitigate the confusion caused to a witness
by inappropriate questioning.
In R v DT,67 the 33-year-old complainant had numerous physical and mental
disabilities that required her use of a wheelchair and left her with hearing, vision, and
speech impairments. She testified through American Sign Language interpreters
and answered questions through “hand gestures, head nods, facial expressions
and audible sounds.”68 Beginning when she was in her early twenties, there were
a number of incidents of sexual activity with the accused, her “favorite uncle.”69
Her evidence was that she had asked him to stop on several occasions and did not
want the sexual activity to take place. The defence argued that the complainant
consented. The trial judge expressed doubt that the complainant understood much
of the sexual activity involved.70 He nonetheless found that non-consent had not
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt because “[s]ome of the complainant’s
answers regarding whether she consented to the sexual activity on the date of
the alleged offence and any sexual activity that occurred prior to that date are
ambiguous.”71 In direct examination, the complainant’s evidence could not have
been labelled unclear; she indicated on several occasions that the accused hurt
her, that the sexual activity made her “crazy,”72 that she wanted it to stop,73 and

67.
68.
69.
70.

2011 ONCJ 213, 85 CR (6th) 195 [DT].
Ibid at para 1.
Ibid at para 47.
Notwithstanding this finding the trial judge made no inquiry into capacity to consent. See
Benedet & Grant, “A Situational Approach to Incapacity and Mental Disability in Sexual
Assault Law” (2012) 43:1 Ottawa L Rev [forthcoming].
71. DT, supra note 67 at para 41.
72. Ibid at para 3.
73. Ibid at para 6.
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that she “didn’t want it.”74 Nonetheless, during cross-examination she appears to
have become confused following leading questions where answers were suggested
to her and several questions were asked in the negative. The trial judge summarized
the evidence, given through the interpreters, as follows:
She was questioned about the incident involving the accused putting his penis in
her vagina. It was put to her that she asked him to touch her with his penis. She
answered “not sure, I’m not sure”. It was put to her that when he was touching her
boobs she said she didn’t want it anymore, counsel putting the emphasis on the
word “anymore”. She answered she “wanted it to stop, but it kept going, kept going
and I said stop, I don’t want”. It was put to her that in the past she allowed the
accused to touch her sexually. Her response was “no, no, no, no”. When she was
asked again about the arm wrestling incident she answered “he touched my breasts
and vagina”. It was suggested by defence counsel that she didn’t say no that time.
Answer: “Right”. She was questioned about the incidents at the camp. Counsel
suggested that the accused would touch her. Answer: “yes that’s right, in the boat”.
It was put to her that she never told anyone that was happening. Answer, “I didn’t
that’s right”. It was suggested that she never told anyone she didn’t want to go back.
She replied “No”.
Defence counsel asked about the accused coming over to her house. He suggested
that she would let him in when he came back. She agreed. Then counsel asked about
August 8, 2009. Defence counsel suggested before he touched her breasts the accused
asked her if he could. She answered “don’t remember, I’m confused”. Defence
suggested the accused put his hand on her waist and then asked if he could touch
her there. Answer: “Oh that’s right I’m sorry”. Defence went on to ask if he did
touch her down there. She replied “yes”. Defence suggested the accused touched her
because she said yes. Answer: “yes that’s right”.
She was asked about the bathroom incident. Defence asked her if the accused
stimulated her in the bathroom. Answer: “yep”. It was suggested that there was lots
of water. Answer: “Yeah right”. She was asked if that scared her. Answer: “yes, yes,
right”. It was suggested she took her wet shorts and clothes and put them in hamper.
She answered “yes”. Counsel suggested that they sat down and had pop together for
15 minutes after that. Answer: “yeah”. It was suggested that she asked the accused
what happened with the water in the bathroom. Answer: “don’t know”. Counsel
then suggested the accused told her he had to leave and gave her a hug and left.
Answer: “yes”.75

It is the ambiguity in this testimony that led the trial judge to have a reasonable
doubt about non-consent. In our view, these paragraphs make it clear both that
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid at paras 6-8.
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the complainant did not want sexual activity with the accused to take place and
that she was having some difficulty with the questions asked on cross-examination.
She acknowledged being confused, but it appears that no steps were taken to
remedy that confusion and the questions kept coming.
The Crown asked the court to look at “the totality of the evidence given
by the complainant.”76 He argued that it was “clear from the entirety of the
complainant’s evidence that she misunderstood the questions”77 surrounding the
incident involving the touching with the accused’s penis. Intervention by the trial
judge in assisting her to understand what was being asked could well have clarified
this ambiguity. Recognition that she was, by her own admission, becoming
confused on cross-examination should have triggered some assistance for this
witness.78 Instead, she was left to “sink or swim” in the hands of defence counsel.
The only acknowledgement of this problem is the Crown’s submission after the
fact that any ambiguities ought to be given less weight because of her disabilities.
This is an unacceptable response to an obvious problem with the criminal trial
process. As we will discuss below, this would have been an ideal case for someone
who could have assisted the complainant in understanding the questions being
asked and ensuring her responses were understood.
Dinardo79 is another example of a case in which the complainant was
clearly confused by questioning. This case demonstrates how an appellate court
decontextualized and, in our view, unnecessarily problematized testimony by a
complainant with a mental disability. In Dinardo the complainant was a 22-yearold woman with a mild mental disability and Tourette’s syndrome. The accused
was a cab driver who was driving the complainant to an activity centre. On
her arrival there she immediately recounted to the staff that the cab driver had
touched her breasts and put his finger inside her vagina.80
On the voir dire to determine whether the complainant was competent to
testify, she said that she understood what it meant to tell the truth, that she knew
what lying meant, and that it was wrong. However, on cross-examination she was
asked whether she ever invented stories. She testified that she did sometimes

76. Ibid at para 25.
77. Ibid at para 25.
78. The trial judge went on to find that the accused had abused a position of trust or authority
and therefore that there was no valid consent, a finding we applaud. However we are deeply
troubled that the trial judge initially was not able to make a finding of non-consent on the
evidence before him. The decision is currently under appeal. Ibid at para 48.
79. Dinardo, supra note 29.
80. Ibid at para 3.
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invent stories “to be funny”81—as an example she said that she sometimes said
silly things such as that a friend “kicked … [her] in the ass.”82 The defence
position was that she could be made to say almost anything. The following
passage is taken from cross-examination by defence counsel followed by redirect
examination by the Crown.
Q

10

This story you told Ms. Thériault on arriving at the Maison des Jeunes, is
it possible that it, that the story was made up?
A Yes.
Q Why did you make the story up?
A Well, I made it up to say he touched me.
Q You made it up to say he touched you?
A Yes.
Q Why? You didn’t like him?
A No, I didn’t like him.
Q Why?
A I was afraid of him.
Q You were afraid of him. Because he had tattoos?
A Yes.
In re-examination, the complainant testified as follows (A.R., at pp. 181-82):

[TRANSLATION]
Q

11

[L]isten to me carefully. He said: “Is it possible that you made up the
story you told Nicole Thériault?
A Oh, I didn’t make it up.
Q Okay. But you said yes. Do you know … what do you mean by that?
What is … explain that, about that.
A I didn’t make it up.
Q Okay. Your sentence, it was: “I made it up—after what he said to
you—to say he touched me”.
A Yes.
Q What do you mean by that?
A He touched me.
Q Okay. But when you told her that, told Nicole Thériault that, was it made
up? Had you made it up?
A No.
At the end of the complainant’s testimony, the trial judge asked the following
questions: (A.R., at p. 182):

[TRANSLATION]
BY THE COURT
81. Ibid at para 7.
82. Ibid.
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Q
A
Q
A

I have one, X. Can you tell me what it means to “make something up”?
I don’t know.
You don’t know, eh? So when you answered earlier that, that you made it
up, you don’t know what that means?
No.83

The trial judge believed the complainant’s allegations and convicted the
accused. The Court ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge had given
inadequate reasons for disbelieving the accused.
It was clear that the Court was troubled by the complainant’s “contradictory
answers”84 and made no attempt to put them in the context of her disability. Her
statement that she sometimes made up stories was translated by the Court into
her admitting that she “had a tendency to lie.”85 She admitted that she made up
stories to be funny, but this acknowledgement was blown out of proportion and
distorted. In fact, her example of making a joking allegation about a friend shows
a great degree of candour on the part of this witness and might cause one to have
more confidence in her evidence than a bold claim that she had never lied.
In cross-examination, the complainant appeared to say that she made up the
allegations but she quickly corrected herself on redirect and clarification by the
trial judge. One could not read this testimony and be left with any reasonable
doubt that she ever admitted to fabricating the allegations. The trial judge zeroed
in on the reason for the apparent contradiction, which was that the witness was
not clear on what “making up” meant.86 She remained steadfast in her claim and
the trial judge believed her.
Our third example demonstrates how judges sometimes make assumptions
about a witness’s level of functioning and what that should mean about her
testimony. Inconsistencies in testimony may be portrayed as evidence of consent
rather than as difficulties with the examination of the witness. Further, this case
illustrates how inappropriate questioning by the Crown can also create difficulties
for a complainant with a mental disability.
In R v Prince,87 the complainant lived in the same apartment building as the
accused. The accused and the complainant had met casually in the hall and, on
two occasions, he entered her apartment under an excuse and initiated sexual
activity with her. On the first occasion, he sat with her on the couch, kissed her,

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Ibid at paras 9-11.
Ibid at para 9.
Ibid at para 17.
The trial was conducted in French, and the actual word at issue was inventer. Ibid at para 72.
2008 MBQB 241, 232 Man R (2d) 281 [Prince].
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and touched her breasts. On the second occasion, the subject of the charge, he
began by kissing her on the couch and ultimately led her to the bedroom where
sexual intercourse took place.88 The trial judge accepted the defence’s argument
that the complainant had consented because she had not said no and did not tell
the accused to stop, although there was evidence that he had told the police that
she probably had said no at some point, but that he could not remember. He had
also admitted to police that he may have been using her. The accused did know
that the complainant had a mental disability and had not asked her if she wanted
the sexual activity to take place.89
An expert witness testified that the complainant was likely to give the answers
she thought the questioner wanted to hear. The complainant contradicted herself
in cross-examination and re-direct and did not recognize the inconsistencies in
her testimony.90 The trial judge stressed how well she did as a witness and how
her performance on the stand appeared to surpass her reported mental age of 6-8
years, but then concluded that “[t]he significant contradictions throughout her
evidence on critical facts make her testimony unreliable.”91 The testimony of the
accused was also inconsistent and contradictory, yet the trial judge relied on his
contradictions as hallmarks of a “ring of truth.”92
This analysis puts the complainant in an impossible position. It is as if she
did not appear disabled enough to need assistance in her testimony yet the problems
with that testimony, which may well have been affected by her disabilities, led
to a reasonable doubt on the question of consent. Instead of making an inquiry
into whether the contradictions could have been reconciled with some support
during questioning, or whether they were a result of the complainant’s high level
of suggestibility, the trial judge instead said that the contradictions led her to a
finding of consent:
During the Crown’s re-examination J.I. contradicted most of what she had said in
cross examination and essentially reverted to her first story. She left the impression
that she wanted to be friendly and accommodating and would agree, in what
appeared to be a very sincere way, with whatever was suggested to her. At no time
in direct examination, cross examination, or redirect examination did she seem
uncertain about what she said. Neither did it appear that she did not understand the
questions posed. Throughout her answers were straightforward and appropriate, but
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Ibid at paras 7-10.
Ibid at paras 36, 38-39.
Ibid at paras 18, 28.
Ibid at paras 59-60.
Ibid at para 61.
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it was evident that she had no appreciation of the stark contradictions in what she
was saying or their impact on the issues before the court.93

The judge indicates that the witness appeared to understand all the questions
yet admits that she did not recognize the blatant inconsistencies in her answers.
Surely the fact that a witness with a mental disability does not even grasp that
she has contradicted herself should have raised concerns during the trial and
not simply be invoked to find her evidence unreliable at the stage of the verdict.
While contradictions may be a product of being unable to keep one’s false story
straight, they may also be the product of confusion with the language chosen by
the questioner, with the point of the question, or with the type of questions utilized.
Even in direct examination, the Crown asked questions that required the
complainant to analyze why the sexual acts were taking place and to offer an
opinion on what the accused was thinking— tasks that required a high level of
abstract thinking and that contributed little to the truth-seeking function:
In direct examination . . . [s]he said as they were having sex she told Mr. Prince it
hurt “a bit”, but he still did it anyway. She said she felt “nervous” and “scared” and
that she told him she did not want to have sex. When asked whether she thought he
knew this she said, “I think so, yeah.” When asked why all of this was happening and
what she thought about it, she said she did not really know. When asked to identify
where he touched her, she did and said she was not comfortable at the time, but then
said she never told Mr. Prince this. However, when asked what she thought should
happen as a result of these events, she later said, “I think he should get charged for
what he did.”
Again, and still in direct examination, J.I. said she thought Mr. Prince knew she
did not want these things to happen. When asked why she thought this, she said,
“I think he knew I did not think it would happen.” When pressed about what she
meant by this she said, “He would not know it,” apparently referring to whether
he knew she did not want to have sex, but she could not explain why. When it was
put to her again by Crown counsel about whether Mr. Prince would know she was
unwilling, she said emphatically, “He would not” and when again asked why, she
said she did not really know.94

Reading this summary, the complainant appears to be most confused by
questions asking her to speculate on the accused’s appreciation of her lack of
consent. This is hardly surprising, since she is being asked to consider how her
own behaviour and demeanour might have appeared to the accused and, in turn,
how that would have affected his state of mind. Any answer she could have given

93. Ibid at para 18.
94. Prince, supra note 87 at paras 11-12.
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to such a question would have been speculative and would have required a high
level of lateral and abstract thinking to process and understand.
R v Poutawa,95 a New Zealand case, is instructive insofar as it demonstrates
not only that the cross-examination of the complainant was clearly confusing
to her, but also that intervention by the trial judge was able to help clarify the
questioning. The complainant was an adult woman with an intellectual disability.
She was described by the judge as having “a reading age of an eight to nine year
old, and the verbal recognition skills about five and a half to six year old. She had
daily visits from caregivers who assisted her with medication, grocery shopping
and financial arrangements.”96 The accused was her neighbour who had visited
the complainant and asked her to call a cab for him. On the way out he kissed her
and later that day returned to her apartment after having been drinking. At some
point he told her that he wanted to have sex with her and led her into the bedroom.
The complainant indicated that she was scared of what he might do if she did
not comply. He then had intercourse with her, followed by anal intercourse; the
complainant then indicated that she did not want this and he stopped. At trial he
was convicted on two counts of rape.
He appealed his conviction, arguing among other things that the assistance
the trial judge gave the complainant showed partiality to the Crown. In particular,
the trial judge interrupted cross-examination of the complainant four times to
ask defence counsel to rephrase questions. At one point, the judge asked the
complainant if she would like a break. The accused also contended that the trial
judge addressed the complainant in a “soft and reassuring way … [that] would
have engendered sympathy for her and prejudice against Mr Poutawa.”97
The trial judge had relied on section 85 of the Evidence Act 2006,98 which
allows a judge to intervene where he or she considers a question “improper,
unfair, misleading, needlessly repetitive, or expressed in language that is too
complicated for the witness to understand,” with mental disability being one
of the factors the judge should consider before doing so.99 The Court of Appeal
upheld the convictions, noting that defence counsel was using complex questions
to make quite a sophisticated point and that it was appropriate for the trial judge
to intervene to clarify them for the complainant. The following excerpt is taken
from the cross-examination:
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

R v Poutawa, [2009] NZCA 482 [Poutawa].
Ibid at para 2.
Ibid at para 8.
(NZ), 2006/69 (NZLII).
Ibid at s 85(1)-(2).

26

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Q — I’m suggesting to you that he must have told you that or how else would
u [sic] have known that’s what he wanted.
A — He told me he wanted sex.
JUDGE
Q — Where were you standing when he told you he wanted sex?
A — In the bedroom.
CROSS EXAMINATION: MR BULLOCK — CONTINUED
Q — That can’t be right [M] if you knew he wanted to have sex when you
followed him to the bedroom, do you agree with that? Do you understand
what I am asking you [M]?
A — Yes.
Q — You do, okay.
JUDGE
Q — [M] did you know before you went into the bedroom that he wanted
to have sex?
A — No I didn’t.
CROSS EXAMINATION: MR BULLOCK — CONTINUED
Q — Why did you say then that you followed him to the bedroom because he
wanted to have sex. Why when you were asked why you followed him to
the bedroom did you answer, “He wanted to have sex with me”.
A — I don’t know. I’m all confused. I’m not sure.
Q — It’s because he’d said that before you went down there and that’s why you
knew when you followed him.
JUDGE
Q — Did he say it to you before you went down to the bedroom?
A — When I went in the bedroom.
CROSS EXAMINATION: MR BULLOCK — CONTINUED
Q — So [M] if [Mr Poutawa] said that he had told you he wanted to have sex
with you out by the back door you would disagree with that?
A — Yes.100

In agreeing with the trial judge’s interventions, the Court of Appeal noted:
To the extent there was any disruption to the flow of the cross-examination, that was
necessary to ensure that questions were put fairly to the complainant. Mr Poutawa
cannot claim then, to have been unfairly prejudiced by these interruptions.101
100. Poutawa, supra note 95 at para 15.
101. Ibid at paras 17-18.
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Canadian judges already have the authority to intervene in questioning that
is confusing or inappropriate for a particular witness, even in the absence of the
kind of legislation invoked here.102 We argue below, however, that specific legislative
direction would be helpful in this context and that laws from New Zealand and
Australia should be considered as possible models for Canada.

IV. EXISTING TESTIMONIAL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR
WITNESSES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
What supports currently exist in Canadian law to deal with complainants who
face the kinds of difficulties in testifying we have identified? In the case of sexual
assault prosecutions, specific accommodations for certain witnesses were formalized
in the Code beginning in 1987.103 These include the possibility of testifying
behind a screen that blocks the complainant’s view of the accused, the use of a
support person, and the possibility of testifying from another location by video
link. While these accommodations are quite modest, all of them have been
challenged at various times as undermining the right of the accused to a fair
trial.104 These accommodations should not necessarily be seen as exhausting the
scope of accommodations that a trial judge can order under her inherent authority
to control the trial process, although we have been unable to find Canadian cases
102. The Canadian appellate case law considering challenges to interventions by trial judges deals
with issues other than intervention on behalf a witness who is confused or suggestible. The
cases do affirm, however, that trial judges have the authority to ask questions of witnesses to
clear up ambiguities and such interventions only attract appellate review when they appear to
compromise the fairness of the trial. See R v Brouillard, [1985] 1 SCR 39, 17 CCC (3d) 193;
R v Valley (1986), 26 CCC (3d) 207, 13 OAC 89 (CA); R v Hamilton, 2011 ONCA 399,
271 CCC (3d) 208.
103. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, SC 1987, c 24, s 14. For
further amendments, see An Act to amend certain Acts with respect to persons with disabilities,
SC 1992, c 21, s 9.
104. The following challenges, all of which involved the accommodation of child witnesses and
not witnesses with mental disabilities, were all ultimately unsuccessful. R v Levogiannis,
[1993] 4 SCR 475, 25 CR (4th) 325 [Levogiannis] (involving a Charter challenge to the
use of screen under previous legislation); R v JZS, 2008 BCCA 401, 61 CR (6th) 282 [JZS]
(involving a Charter challenge to the use of screens under current legislation); R v CNH,
2006 BCPC 119, 140 CRR (2d) 213 (involving a Charter challenge to testifying through
CCTV and in the presence of a support person); R v R (ME) (1989), 49 CCC (3d) 475, 71
CR (3d) 113 (NSCA) (involving a Charter challenge to testifying over CCTV); L(DO), supra
note 15 (involving a Charter challenge to section 715.1 of the Criminal Code, which allows
video-taped evidence to be introduced).
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in which trial judges provided additional accommodations for sexual assault
complainants with mental disabilities.
Most of the existing accommodations in the Code were designed to deal
with child victims of sexual assault; however, they also apply to witnesses with
disabilities, a linkage that we have challenged elsewhere as problematic.105 It is
difficult to find case law dealing with these provisions in the context of people
with disabilities. A recent study concluded:
The vulnerable adult witness provisions have been the subject of very little reported
case law, and the survey indicates that there have been relatively few applications
for the use of testimonial aids for adults. When applications are made for the use of
testimonial aids for adults, they are generally successful, but they are less likely to be
granted than applications for child witnesses.106

Some of the more extensive case law involving child witnesses is nonetheless
helpful. This is not because adults with disabilities are analogous to children,
nor because they necessarily have the same accommodation needs. Rather, these
child-witness cases demonstrate that the courts have consistently held that these
accommodations do not infringe on the fair trial rights of the accused.107 While
the complainants in these cases are very different, the implications for the fair
trial rights of an accused are similar; for example, where a screen is used for a
child complainant as where it is used for an adult complainant with a disability.
A. SUPPORT PERSONS

Section 486.1 of the Code allows for a support person to be provided to a witness
who is under eighteen or who has a disability. That support person is someone
of the witness’s choice, although they cannot themselves be a witness in the
proceedings.108 Most cases suggest that the role of the support person is just to
be there and not to interact with the witness or the lawyer in any way. Section
486.1(5) provides that the judge may order that the support person and the witness
not communicate with each other while the witness testifies.109 Subsection (6)
105. Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief,” supra note 9. In fact, many of
these accommodations would probably assist most sexual assault complainants regardless of
their age or abilities.
106. Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family, Testimonial Support Provisions for
Children and Vulnerable Adults (Bill C-2): Case Law Review and Perceptions of the Judiciary by
Nicholas Bala et al (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2011) at x.
107. Prince, supra note 87.
108. Although there may be some discretion to allow a witness to be a support person where they
have already testified.
109. See e.g. R v Brown, 2010 SKQB 420 at para 7, 368 Sask R 69 [Brown]; R v MF, 2010
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prevents any adverse inference from being drawn from the fact that an order was
or was not made under this section. For a witness under eighteen or a person with
a mental or physical disability, the provision is worded in presumptive language
such that if the Crown applies for a support person, the judge shall order it unless he
or she is of the opinion that the order would “interfere with the proper administration of justice.”110
When dealing with witnesses with disabilities, the most common support
persons requested are victim services support workers, although in some cases the
witness may ask a friend or family member.111 In our view, the presence of a support
person is a good start in terms of making a complainant with a disability feel
secure enough to tell her story. However, as we will discuss below, it does nothing
to facilitate the communication of her evidence, particularly in the face of what
can sometimes be confusing and difficult questions on the witness stand.
B. TESTIMONY OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM OR BEHIND A SCREEN

Section 486.2(1) provides that a witness who is able to communicate evidence
but has difficulty doing so because of her physical or mental disability may testify
outside the courtroom or behind a screen or other device that would allow the
witness not to see the accused. Again, the order must be granted on application
by the Crown unless the judge determines that it would “interfere with the proper
administration of justice.”112 This section also provides that a witness shall not
testify outside the courtroom unless arrangements are made for the accused, the
judge, and the jury to watch the testimony by means of closed circuit television,
and that the accused is permitted to communicate with counsel while watching
the testimony.
Prior to 2006,113 both of these provisions required a pre-testimonial inquiry
to determine whether the testimonial aid was necessary to obtain a full and candid

110.

111.
112.

113.

ONSC 4018 at para 97, [2010] OJ no 3578; R v Aikoriogie, 2004 ONCJ 96 at para 8, 62
WCB (2d) 118; R v JW, 2007 BCPC 81 at para 2, [2007] BCWLD 4522. The case law
demonstrates that this order is commonly made but not discussed.
In the version of section 486.1(2) in force prior to 2007, the order was discretionary; the
subsection then stated that the judge will only order a support person if he or she is of the
opinion that “the order is necessary to obtain a full and candid account from the witness of
the acts complained of.” Code, supra note 11, s 486.1(2).
Bala et al, supra note 106 at 52.
Subsection 2 provides for use of these devices with other witnesses if it is necessary to obtain
a full and candid account from the witness of the acts complained of. Code, supra note 11, ss
486.1(1)-(2).
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the
Canada Evidence Act, SC 2005, c 32.
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account of the acts at issue. Under the current legislation, it is not necessary
to establish a need for these accommodations; the court is mandated to grant
them unless they interfere with the proper administration of justice. However,
the right to these aids for witnesses with mental disabilities is not absolute, as it is
for children. The Crown must first establish that the witness will have difficulty
communicating her evidence because of a disability.
The situation is further complicated by the permissive provision applicable
to all witnesses under section 486.2(2). It allows for an application to testify
behind a screen or to testify outside the courtroom for any witness if it is necessary
to obtain a full and candid account from that witness, echoing the language of
the provision as it existed for vulnerable witnesses prior to 2006. The criteria for
determining whether to allow either measure are the same as those for allowing a
support person. One of those criteria is whether the witness has a mental or physical
disability, which might suggest that disability is not automatically grounds for
accommodation under section 486.2(1).
While we applaud efforts to extend the possibility of this accommodation to
other witnesses, this overlap is problematic because we believe the presumptive
language of section 486.2(1) should prevail for all complainants with mental
disabilities. The question of whether the complainant will have difficulty giving
her evidence is often impossible to determine until she has actually testified.
Courts have disagreed as to whether judges retain the discretion to determine
which of these means of testifying will be used. For example, in British Columbia,
the courts have held that the judge must order the type of accommodation sought
by the Crown under this section, and that the judge has no discretion to depart
from the Crown’s request unless it would interfere with the administration of
justice.114 In Manitoba, by contrast, the Court of Queen’s Bench has suggested
that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to control the trial process and
that he or she has the authority to choose between the types of accommodation
provided for in this section.115 This latter approach appears contrary to the
legislative intent in making the section automatic. Allowing the judge discretion
to choose the method of accommodation will inevitably result in inquiries into
which type of accommodation is necessary to get a full and candid account
from the witness—precisely the type of assessment these amendments were
designed to avoid.
114. R v SBT, 2008 BCSC 711 at paras 36-40, 232 CCC (3d) 115.
115. R v CTL, 2009 MBQB 266 at paras 16-19, 246 Man R (2d) 170. In Brown, the
Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench preferred this approach over that taken by the BCSC. Supra
note 109.
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In order to understand the minimal intrusion on the trial process resulting
from the use of a screen, it is important to stress how a screen operates. The
screen merely blocks the complainant’s view of the accused. The accused and
other participants in the courtroom still have a full view of the witness. As Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé described in Levogiannis,
The screen does not obstruct the view of the complainant by the accused, his counsel,
the Crown or the judge. All are present in court. The evidence is given and the trial
is conducted in the usual manner, including cross-examination. As a result, the issue
before this Court, is, simply put, whether a witness’s obstructed view of an accused,
infringes the rights of such accused under s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.116

Thus, all that is ‘lost’ is the complainant’s view of the accused. Only if we
assume that the accused has a right to intimidate the complainant by his presence or
facial expressions can this measure be seen as a violation of his rights. As one judge
put it, there is no right on the part of the accused to glower at a complainant.117
In Levogiannis118 the predecessor section, which vested the trial judge with
the discretion to order a screen, was upheld against a constitutional challenge
in the context of a sexual assault prosecution involving a child. The Court, per
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, held that the section did not infringe on the accused’s
fair trial rights because its purpose was to facilitate the truth-seeking function by
enabling the complainant to be able to give her evidence more fully and candidly.
In JZS,119 the accused challenged the constitutionality of the current provisions.
The defence argued that the provisions’ presumptive nature distinguished them
from the legislation that was upheld in Levogiannis. The Charter challenge focused
on the fact that the new provisions had shifted the process for determining the
type of testimonial aids necessary from the court to the Crown. The accused was
convicted of sexually assaulting his son and daughter, who were eight and eleven
by the time of the trial. Both children testified behind a screen on a promise to
tell the truth. It was argued that using the screen and testifying on a promise to
116. Levogiannis, supra note 104 at para 17.
117. R v Accused (T4/88), [1989] 1 NZLR 660 (CA). McMullin J, concurring, cited in R v
Levogiannis (1990), 1 OR (3d) 351 at para 35, 62 CCC (3d) 59 (CA). McMullin J said,
“Confrontation in the sense of being in the presence of one’s accusers is one thing; but
confrontation merely to afford the opportunity to glower at and thereby intimidate witnesses
is another. The sight of an accused person from whose actions a child has lived in terror in
the past is very likely to intimidate that child in the giving of evidence about that accused,
particularly when the evidence involves him in incidents of the most intimate and degrading
kind.”
118. Levogiannis, supra note 104 at paras 43-44.
119. JZS, supra note 104 at para 14.
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tell the truth rather than under oath violated the fair trial rights of the accused
under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.120
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the
presumptive nature of the legislation justified a departure from Levogiannis. The
court noted that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had framed the issue as “simply put,
whether a witness’ obstructed view of an accused, infringes the rights of such
accused under section 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.”121 Relying on a decision of the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Justice Smith held:
The right to face one’s accusers is not in this day and age to be taken in the literal
sense. In my opinion, it is simply the right of an accused person to be present in
court, to hear the case against him and to make answer and defence to it.122

A physical screen can be awkward to use and may in itself be intimidating for
some complainants, although one English study suggests that complainants generally
appreciate the screen and would prefer to use one if given the opportunity.123
The Code also provides the possibility of testimony by live video link, which
affords the complainant more freedom and could permit him or her to testify
from familiar or comfortable surroundings.124 This method too has its drawbacks.
Even if the equipment functions perfectly, it may be beneficial for the judge and
jury to have the immediacy that comes from being in the same room as the
complainant. Also, the video-link room may itself seem isolated and unfriendly.125
C. VIDEO RECORDINGS

The screen, the support person, and the video link are all measures designed to
increase the psychological comfort of the witness in the hope that he or she will
be better able to testify to the events at issue. None of these accommodations alter
Ibid.
Charter, supra note 4, ss 7, 11(d).
Ibid at para 34, citing R v R (ME) (1989), 49 CCC (3d) 475 at 484, 90 NSR (2d) 439 (CA).
UK, Home Office Research, Are special measures working? Evidence from surveys of vulnerable
and intimidated witnesses (Research Study 283) (London: Home Office, 2004), online:
<http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/hors/hors283.pdf> at 71, 79. In particular, twenty-two of
twenty-seven witnesses who used screens considered them to be helpful.
124. For example, in Harper, the complainant testified from the long term care facility in which
she resided. She suffered from a severe form of multiple sclerosis, which severely affected
her memory and rendered her unable to walk. After medical evidence indicated she would
function better in familiar surroundings and with her care worker present, the trial judge
ordered that she be permitted to testify from her home. Supra note 5 at para 6.
125. Allison Riding, “The Crown Court Witness Service: Little Help in the Witness Box” (1999)
38:4 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 411 at 413.

120.
121.
122.
123.
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the requirement that the complainant give live evidence in the trial. There is one
accommodation in the Code, however, that can be used to limit the requirement for
such testimony. Section 715.2 provides that if a witness with a disability is able to
communicate evidence but has difficulty doing so because of this disability, a video
recording made within a reasonable time after the alleged offence in which he or
she describes the acts complained of is admissible if he or she adopts the contents
of the video. The trial judge has the discretion not to allow the admission of
the video if such admission would interfere with the proper administration of
justice.126 The limitation of this option is that the witness is still subject to crossexamination on the contents of the video.
Most judges are willing to utilize these provisions to admit video-recorded
evidence. One problem, however, may be the weight given by judges (or juries)
to such evidence, especially where the complainant can no longer clearly remember
the events and may contradict some of the earlier statements made in her
trial testimony. This problem may be particularly acute where the complainant
has serious memory deficits and may not be able to confirm in court that the
statements made are true (because he or she does not remember making the
recording).127 In R v CCF,128 the Court held that the witness must remember “giving
the statement and … [must testify] that she was then attempting to be honest
and truthful.”129 It is not necessary that the witness have a present recollection
of the events in question because this requirement can make cross-examination
difficult if the witness does not recall the events fully. Section 715.2 has been
upheld (in the context of child witnesses) by a unanimous Court as not violating
the accused’s right to a fair trial.130 The Court held that there is no right to have
cross-examination occur contemporaneously with the giving of evidence.
Most of the accommodations discussed thus far are relatively noncontroversial131
and provide some support for people with disabilities testifying in sexual assault
cases. It is surprising, therefore, that we do not see more applications for their
use in this context. The more important point, however, is that they appear to be
fairly modest in their impact. Certainly they do not change anything about the
126. The Code provides other measures to facilitate the participation of sexual assault
complainants, such as publication bans and provisions not allowing the accused to personally
cross-examine the complainant, but none of these are targeted at the specific needs of
witnesses with disabilities and we do not discuss them here.
127. Harper, supra note 5 at para 55.
128. [1997] 3 SCR 1183, 154 DLR (4th) 13.
129. Ibid at para 36.
130. L(DO), supra note 15.
131. Bala et al, supra note 106 at 61.
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questioning that the witness must undergo, with the exception of shortening the
examination-in-chief where a video-recorded statement is used.
These accommodations appear to focus on making a complainant more
comfortable in the witness box either by, for example, blocking her view of the
accused, having a familiar person with him or her, or by allowing her evidence to
be admitted through a video link rather than live testimony. Such accommodations
assume that if we can make a witness more comfortable with her surroundings, we
will get better testimony from him or her. However, in our view, these provisions do
little to actually address the problems we see in the process of getting that evidence
from the complainant, either through direct examination or cross-examination,
and hence do not deal adequately with the problems we are addressing in this
article. It is important to make all complainants as comfortable as possible when
testifying in a sexual assault trial. But, particularly with this group of witnesses,
such measures fall short of ensuring that their testimony is acquired in a fair manner
that contributes to, rather than hinders, the truth-seeking process.
D. INTERMEDIARIES FOR WITNESSES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES

There is no one simple accommodation that will address the difficulties with
cross-examination. Judges and lawyers need to be educated about the kinds of
assistance witnesses may need, and assumptions about the inviolability of unfettered
cross-examination need to be confronted. It is insufficient to try and factor in the
effects of the complainant’s disability only at the final stage of weighing the evidence
as a way of offsetting problems with the examination and cross-examination
of the witness. Instead, trial judges must do what they can to understand the
challenges that the particular witness is facing and insist that questions be broken
down into simple parts and that negative and closed leading questions be avoided
where they are likely to produce reflexive compliance on the part of the witness.
The problem with relying entirely on trial judges, however, is that they may
not have any detailed understanding of the challenges faced by a particular
complainant. While they can be expected to try to control overly complex questions,
they may not be aware that a particular question is confusing to the witness.
Clearly, more personalized support is needed. We argue that the use of
intermediaries would be a significant positive development in Canada for sexual
assault complainants with mental disabilities. These are trained individuals who can
assist a witness both in understanding the questions asked and in communicating
her answers. They can also help to prepare the judge and lawyers in advance of
the trial to understand the abilities of the particular complainant so that difficulties can be anticipated and avoided. Intermediaries go beyond the role of
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interpreters in that they can suggest what kinds of questions are confusing and how
questions might be asked in a simpler or more understandable way. Intermediaries
could be used effectively at all stages of the process, from police questioning
to testifying at trial.
England has the most developed system of intermediaries that we have found.
In England and Wales, the Youth Justice and Evidence Act 1999132 authorizes the use
of “special measures” to assist vulnerable witnesses.133 Witnesses may be eligible
for special measures because of their age, mental capacity, fear, or distress. Section
16134 sets out which witnesses are eligible for special measures on grounds of
age or incapacity. Witnesses with mental disabilities are eligible, although special
measures are only available for such witnesses if the “quality” of their evidence
(as defined in section 16(5)) would be diminished by reason of the disability.135
One special measure available to section 16 witnesses is the use of an
intermediary, set out in section 29.136 The intermediary may be quite active
in the proceedings, “translating” both the questions put to the witness and the
witness’ answers while also explaining the questions or responses where necessary.
132. (UK), c 23 [YJEA 1999].
133. Ibid at s 23-30.
134. This section has been in force since 24 July 2002. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act
1999 (Commencement No. 7) Order 2002, SI 2002/1739.
135. YJEA 1999, supra note 132, s 16 (1)-(2), (5). The relevant parts of section 16 read as follows:
16. Witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of age or incapacity.
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter a witness in criminal proceedings (other than the
accused) is eligible for assistance by virtue of this section—
(a) if under the age of 17 at the time of the hearing; or
(b) if the court considers that the quality of evidence given by the witness is
likely to be diminished by reason of any circumstances falling within subsection (2).
(2) The circumstances falling within this subsection are—
(a) that the witness—
(i) suffers from mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health
Act 1983, or
(ii) otherwise has a significant impairment of intelligence and social
functioning;
(b) that the witness has a physical disability or is suffering from a physical
disorder.
….
(5)

In this Chapter references to the quality of a witness’s evidence are to its quality in terms
of completeness, coherence and accuracy; and for this purpose “coherence” refers to a
witness’s ability in giving evidence to give answers which address the questions put to the
witness and can be understood both individually and collectively.

136. YJEA 1999, supra note 132, s 29.
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The purpose of an intermediary is set out in section 29(2):
The function of an intermediary is to communicate—
(a) to the witness, questions put to the witness, and
(b) to any person asking such questions, the answers given by the witness in
reply to them,
and to explain such questions or answers so far as necessary to enable them to be
understood by the witness or person in question.137

In the 2007 review of intermediary pilot projects,138 the authors described
how intermediaries work in a court setting. While the authors do not provide any
citations for the cases they describe, the report is instructive.
During cross-examination, intermediaries can flag non-comprehension of
questions. Judges can instruct the witness to alert the intermediary when a question
in cross-examination is not understood. Intermediaries can also intervene of their
own accord. The following exchange is illustrative:
Defence barrister:
Intermediary:
Judge:
Defence barrister:

When you went to speak to the police ladies, do you know why
you went to speak to them?
Your Honour, L finds it difficult to understand ‘Why’ questions.
Defence counsel will re-phrase the question.
You remember going to the police station?139

Intermediaries prepare reports to familiarize the court with the particular
witness’ needs. As a result of an intermediary’s report, at least one judge was able
to intervene when questions became too complex.
[A] defence barrister asked a witness whether the money he received weekly was
more or less than a certain sum. The judge referred to the report to emphasise that
the witness was likely to have difficulty with comparative questions.140

Another defence lawyer stated that he or she used the intermediary report
when preparing an appropriate cross-examination.141 However, not all advocates
were willing to modify their style of questioning:

137. Ibid at s 29(2).
138. Joyce Plotnikoff & Richard Woolfson, The ‘Go-Between’: evaluation of intermediary pathfinder
projects (Lexicon Limited, 2007), online: <http://www.lexiconlimited.co.uk/PDF%20files/
Intermediaries_study_report.pdf>.
139. Ibid at 53.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid at 44.
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[A]dvocates’ ability to modify their style of questioning varied widely. Some adapted
their questions in light of information in intermediary reports. Three defence
barristers were particularly careful to speak slowly, mostly use short questions, follow a
chronological order and ‘signpost’ a change of subject. Some problematic approaches
persisted despite interventions by the intermediary and sometimes by the judge or
magistrates. Nearly all intermediary interventions concerning questions were seen as
appropriate. However, views of appropriateness were closely linked to the ability of
advocates to take account of intermediary guidance. Where advocates did not modify
their questioning style the rate of intermediary interventions tended to increase, in
a few instances exposing the intermediary to comments from advocates that they
had intervened too often. Some prosecution advocates, however, thought that
intermediaries had not intervened enough.142

The mere presence of an intermediary may help slow things down for a
complainant with a mental disability, which can increase her ability to understand
the questioning in cross-examination.143
In some cases, pre-trial hearings can be used to lay the ground rules for
questioning and the timing of judges’ interventions. For example:
The judge set the following ground rules: when the advocate asked a question, the
intermediary would say when there was a problem; the advocate would then rephrase; if the intermediary said there was still a problem, the intermediary would be
entitled, with the judge’s authority, to put the substance of the question in a simpler
way; and the intermediary would intervene in answers only on request.144

Laying ground rules in this fashion can both reduce misunderstanding of the
role of the intermediary during cross-examination and respond to the criticism
that the intermediary may improperly cross the line into the role of advocate for
the complainant. This is less likely to happen where the intermediary can voice
concerns with the questions before the witness attempts to answer them, rather
than after the fact on the basis that the answer given was unsatisfactory.
Intermediaries are also able to re-phrase questions.145 Although this often
worked well, there were some concerns with specific interventions. Some magistrates
were concerned that “interventions by intermediaries could ‘lead to a danger of
advocates losing the flow and of misinterpretation.’”146 While these are important
concerns, it appears that the introduction of intermediaries has been a promising
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Ibid at 52.
Ibid at 53.
Ibid at 45.
Ibid at 53.
Ibid at 54.

38

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

development for criminal trials in England and Wales and that the intention is to
continue with their use.
Intermediaries are not only useful in courtroom settings but also in police
interviews of witnesses. They can assist in having the complainant’s story understood
at the earliest stages of the process and in preparing the prosecution and court for
the needs of the particular witness.147
The creation of an intermediary report, in which the intermediary describes
the specific needs of the witness, allows counsel to modify their style of questioning
and enables judges to intervene more confidently. Pre-trial hearings and rules
established before trial allow all parties to understand what interventions are
appropriate, reduces concerns during the trial, and improves the smooth conduct
of the trial.
Intermediaries are available in other jurisdictions as well. New Zealand and a
number of jurisdictions in Australia also allow intermediaries to be used in child
sexual assault trials, but they have not been extended to adult witnesses with
disabilities.148 In South Africa, intermediaries were available only for child
witnesses until 2007. In 2007, section 170A(1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Act was amended to extend eligibility for intermediaries
to some adults with disabilities, although disability is defined in terms of being
under the mental age of eighteen years.149
In our view, it is problematic to define the need for an intermediary based
on some notion of a particular mental age rather than on the supports the witness
needs to have her evidence fully heard in court. The language of this legislation
has resulted in some difficulties with the implementation of the law. The
requirement that testifying would expose the witness to “undue” stress or suffering

147. R v Watts, [2010] EWCA Crim 1824, [2011] 1 Crim LR 58 at 61.
148. See generally Annie Cossins, “Cross-Examination in Child Sexual Assault Trials: Evidentiary
Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse?” (2009) 33:1 Melbourne UL Rev 68; Elisabeth
McDonald & Yvette Tinsley, “Use of alternative ways of giving evidence by vulnerable
witnesses: Current proposals, issues and challenges” (Victoria: University of Wellington Legal
Research Paper No 2, 2011), online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1885145> [Cossins]. The current status of intermediaries in New Zealand is uncertain,
as the Evidence Act 2006 removed the explicit reference to intermediaries and enacted
a provision allowing for “communication assistance.” If “communication assistance” is
interpreted to include intermediaries, then the new Act may in fact extend the availability
of intermediaries to both children and adults. (NZ), 2006/69, ss 80-81. See Emma Davies,
Emily Henderson & Kirsten Hanna, “Facilitating children to give best evidence: Are there
better ways to challenge children’s testimony?” (2010) 34:4 Crim LJ 347.
149. (S Afr), No 32 of 2007 [emphasis added].
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has been interpreted by the courts as imposing a very high standard.150 In S v
Stefaans,151 the Cape High Court reasoned that since complainants in sexual
offence cases are invariably exposed to severe trauma, “undue connotes a degree
of stress greater than the ordinary stress to which witnesses, including witnesses in
complaints of offences of a sexual nature, are subject to.”152 Furthermore, the use
of “may” in the statute leaves the magistrate with significant discretion to choose
whether or not to involve an intermediary. Thus, even if testifying would expose
the witness to undue trauma, the magistrate may still choose not to appoint an
intermediary. There is some speculation that this has resulted in inconsistency in
the use of intermediaries.153
Scotland has also considered introducing intermediaries.154 However, under
their common law inherent powers, courts are already using “appropriate adults”
to act as intermediaries in some situations.155 Although this practice is described
as “widespread,”156 it is difficult to find specific examples of the use of an
“appropriate adult” in the courtroom or during cross-examination. Appropriate
adults are envisioned as primarily providing aid during police investigations,157
although the guidelines indicate that appropriate adults may be used in court:
2.5 The primary role of the appropriate adult is to facilitate communication, in
addition to this their presence may also provide support and reassurance for an individual with a mental disorder (witness, victim, suspect, accused) at police interview,
specific forensic procedures or examination, precognition and at court.158

150. Ibid, s 170A(1).
151. [1999] 1 All SA 191, 1999 (1) SACR 182(C).
152. S v Manqaba 2005 (2) SACR 489 (W) at 187B, cited in Carmel R Matthias & F Noel Zaal,
“Intermediaries for Child Witnesses: Old Problems, New Solutions and Judicial Differences
in South Africa” (2011) 19:2 Int’l J Child Rts 251 at 257.
153. In S v F 1999 (1) SACR 571 (C) “a court went so far as to refuse appointment of an
intermediary even after evidence by a psychiatrist that a child who had been raped was
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.” Ibid at 258.
154. Scottish Government Justice and Communities Victims and Witnesses Unit, Consultation
Paper on the Use of Intermediaries for Vulnerable Witnesses in Scotland, (Edinburgh: 2007),
online: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/10/09143729/0> [Scotland,
Consultation Paper].
155. Scottish Government, “Appropriate Adults,” online: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/
Justice/law/victims-witnesses/Appropriate-Adult> [Scotland, “Appropriate Adults”].
156. Scotland, Consultation Paper, supra note 154 at para 12.
157. Scotland, “Appropriate Adults,” supra note 155.
158. Scotland, Guidance on Appropriate Adult Services in Scotland, (2007) at para 2.5, online:
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1099/0053903.pdf> [Scotland, Guidance].
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Anecdotal evidence indicates that the extension of appropriate adults into
the courtroom occurs on an ad hoc basis and with varying degrees of success.159
England also has a codified appropriate adult scheme that does not extend to the
courtroom.160
Canadian courts have recognized that witnesses with mental disabilities have
a right to equality without discrimination in the courtroom.161 As the British
Columbia Court of Appeal has noted:
We must, of course, ensure that those with mental and physical disabilities receive
equal protection of the law guaranteed to everyone by s. 15 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. This will sometimes require that their evidence be presented
along with the evidence of others who are able to explain, support and supplement
it, so that, to the extent that this is possible, the court will receive the account which
the witness would have given had he or she not been disabled.162

We read this statement not as an expectation that non-disabled adults should
be used to ‘fix’ the evidence of those with disabilities in order to make it ‘normal,’
but rather as an endorsement of the idea that access to justice must take into
account systemic inequalities. The court goes on to note:
But the evidence will, of course, still have to meet the high standard of proof always
required when criminal charges are involved, because the liberty of the accused, and
the importance of guarding against the injustice of convicting the innocent, require
in these cases as much as any other a “solid foundation for a verdict of guilt.”163

We believe the development of a program of trained intermediaries in Canada
would improve the ability of this group of complainants to have their stories told
to a court. Intermediaries could help with police questioning, plan the neces-

159. British Psychological Society, “Response to the Scottish Government consultation: The Use
of Intermediaries for Vulnerable Witnesses in Scotland” (2008) at 4, online: <http://scotland.
gov.uk/Resource/Doc/214745/0057298.pdf>.
160. It is enacted in Code C of the Codes of Practice. Home Office, (1 November 2011), online:
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/police/powers/pace-codes/> [Codes of Practice]. The Codes of
Practice are issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to power granted by section 66 of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. (UK), c 60, s 66.
161. The right to equality in legal proceedings also has international recognition in the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3, 46 ILM 443, art 13,
13. States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal
basis with others, including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants, including
as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative and other preliminary stages.

162. R v Pearson (1994), 82 BCAC 1 at para 36, 36 CR (4th) 343 [emphasis added].
163. Ibid (citation omitted).
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sary accommodations for the court process, inform the judge about possible
difficulties the witness might experience in testifying, and assist in the direct
and cross-examination processes. Careful use of intermediaries could increase the
likelihood that a witness will be able to testify and have her evidence heard. In
our view, this bolsters rather than detracts from the solid foundation underlying
a guilty verdict and, as we discuss in more detail below in this Part, is entirely
consistent with the fair trial rights of the accused.
Of course, we recognize that such accommodations will not solve all of the
problems faced by women with mental disabilities who complain of sexual assault.
The fact remains that as long as witnesses with mental disabilities tend to be
equated with young children,164 stereotyped as hypersexual165 or as unable to tell
the truth,166 they will continue to face even more barriers in sexual assault prosecutions than other witnesses. In this context, we think it is important that the
accommodations and testimonial supports offered to complainants in these cases
be more substantive than a screen and a support person sitting nearby. We also
think it is important that more active support, like intermediaries, be viewed not
strictly as aid for persons with mental disabilities but as necessary guidance to
allow non-disabled participants in the criminal justice system to overcome their
own lack of knowledge so as to interact meaningfully with these complainants.
E.

GIVING JUDGES LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE TO SUPPORT
WITNESSES

As mentioned earlier in the discussion of Poutawa,167 there is precedent in other
jurisdictions for instructing judges to take a more active role in preventing the
kinds of questions that do not elicit useful evidence from a witness with a
mental disability. Most Australian jurisdictions have legislation that directs
trial judges to intervene when questions are inappropriate.168 In New South
164. See e.g. ICH Clare & GH Gudjonsson, “Interrogative suggestibility, confabulation, and
acquiescence in people with mild learning disabilities (mental handicap): Implications for
reliability during police interrogations” (1993) 32:3 British J of Clinical Psychology 295.
165. See e.g. the trial decision in R v Alsadi (27 July 2011), Vancouver 213734-2-C (BC Prov Ct)
and Harper, supra note 5 at para 16.
166. Dinardo, supra note 29 at para 6.
167. Supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
168. See Cossins, supra note 148 at 93. In 1995, the Australian Commonwealth, New South
Wales, and Tasmania enacted uniform evidence acts, which included a provision giving
judges the discretion to disallow misleading or intimidating questions, taking into account
any mental disability on the part of the witness. Similar legislation is in place in all the other
Australian jurisdictions, although they have not explicitly adopted the Uniform Evidence Act.
For instance, Evidence Act 1939 (NT), s 16 reads as follows:
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Wales, for example, the court must disallow a question put to a witness in
cross-examination if it:
(a) is misleading or confusing, or
(b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating
or repetitive, or
(c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise
inappropriate, or
(d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the
witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical
disability).169

The court must consider a number of factors, including mental and physical
disability.170 A question will not be disallowed merely because it challenges the
truthfulness or the accuracy of the witness.171
The New South Wales legislation makes intervention mandatory; objection by opposing counsel is not required to trigger the duty to intervene.
Queensland, by contrast, casts the authority to intervene in permissive
terms.172 While such a law does not on its own give judges all the tools they
need to grasp what kinds of questions might be improper for a particular
witness, it does make clear that the right to cross-examine is not unlimited
and that a one-size-fits-all approach to cross-examination is inconsistent with
substantive equality.

16 Disallowance of question

169.
170.
171.
172.

(1)

The Court may disallow any question that the Court considers to be misleading,
confusing, annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, repetitive or phrased in
inappropriate language.

(2)

In determining whether to disallow a question, the Court must have regard to:
(a) any relevant condition, attribute or characteristic of the witness, including:
(i) the age, maturity and cultural background of the witness; and
(ii) any mental, intellectual or physical characteristic of the witness; and
(b) if the witness is a child – the principles set out in section 21D.

In 2005, the Uniform Evidence Act was amended to remove the judicial discretion to allow
improper questions, and the list of impermissible questions was expanded. The new uniform
evidence act has since been enacted in New South Wales, the Commonwealth, the Australian
Capital Territory, and substantially in Victoria. See e.g. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 41-42.
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 41(1).
Ibid, s 41(2)(b).
Ibid, s 41(3)(a).
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21, as enacted by Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 No 43
(Qld), s 45.
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V. TOWARDS THE FAIR TRIAL
In Canada, where the fair trial rights of the accused are constitutionally protected, opposition to the reforms proposed in this paper is likely to be grounded
in section 7 of the Charter. The concern is that if cross-examination is fettered in
any way, if it is rendered less aggressive, or if a third party mediates the questioning,
then the accused’s right to confront his accuser and to challenge the prosecution’s
case is diminished, thereby undermining his right to make full answer and
defence under section 7. The Court has recognized that the right to crossexamine Crown witnesses “without significant and unwarranted constraint” is
protected as part of the right to make full answer and defence.173
However, the Court has also made clear that while the right to cross-examine
is important, it is not unlimited and must not be abused. Lawyers are not permitted
to harass witnesses, to engage in misrepresentation or repetitiousness, or to ask
questions the prejudicial effect of which outweighs their probative value.174 Trial
judges have broad discretion to ensure fairness and to see that justice is done.175
Our view is that an abstract consideration of the boundaries of the right
to make full answer and defence through cross-examination is unhelpful. The
Court recognized this in its discussion of the admissibility of hearsay evidence
in R v Khelawon:
… the constitutional right guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter is not the right to
confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses in itself. The adversarial trial process,
which includes cross-examination, is but the means to achieve the end. Trial fairness,
as a principle of fundamental justice, is the end that must be achieved. Trial fairness
embraces more than the rights of the accused. While it undoubtedly includes the
right to make full answer and defence, the fairness of the trial must be assessed in the
light of broader societal concerns.176

Those concerns include recognition that in the context of sexual assault, sections “15 and 28 of the Charter guaranteeing equality to men and women, although
not determinative should be taken into account in determining the reasonable limitations that should be placed upon the cross-examination of a complainant … .”177
Where the sexual assault trial involves a witness with a mental disability, the
right to equality must also include consideration of disability and sex as intersecting
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

R v Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5 at para 2, [2004] 1 SCR 193.
Ibid at para 44.
Ibid at para 45.
2006 SCC 57 at para 48, [2006] 2 SCR 787.
R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595 at 669, 86 CCC (3d) 481 [emphasis omitted].
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grounds of discrimination. Taking steps to ensure that witnesses with mental
disabilities give as full and candid an account as possible enhances the fairness of
the trial and the search for the truth. As one Australian judge has noted:
The difficulties encountered by complainants in sexual assault cases in the criminal
justice system have been a focus of concern for several decades. Judges play an
important role in protecting complainants from unnecessary, inappropriate and
irrelevant questioning by or on behalf of an accused. That role is perfectly consistent
with the requirements of a fair trial, which requirements do not involve treating the
criminal justice system as if it were a forensic game in which every accused is entitled
to some kind of sporting chance.178

Thus, we are of the view that giving trial judges the responsibility to intervene
to ensure that witnesses are questioned fairly is entirely consistent with section 7
of the Charter.
The use of intermediaries may also be challenged as a limitation on defence
counsel’s ability to challenge a witness. In one particular case cited in the English
pilot project, the intermediary asked that a complex cross-examination question be
broken up into parts because she suspected from the response that the question had
not been understood by a child witness. Defence counsel commented:
The intermediary must not interpose their sense of what doesn’t fit on answers
apparently inconsistent with the evidence-in-chief by dressing it up as “The witness
did not understand the question.” I was OK about this instance but it is a very
fine line. An inconsistency may go to the heart of the defence case. It is the role of
prosecution counsel to re-examine if there are inconsistencies in the child’s evidence.
There is also a concern that an intermediary’s intervention after the child has
answered could be a prompt to the child that he/she has “got it wrong”.179

These concerns are understandable and it is important that intermediaries
be well-trained and that defence counsel be given the opportunity to object
if the intermediary’s assistance risks rendering the trial unfair. Trial judges
can be expected to be alert to this concern in weighing the evidence in a manner
analogous to their control of re-examination by the Crown.
Finally, it is worth noting that all of these accommodations would properly
be available to an accused person with a mental disability, and indeed some of the
initiatives in other jurisdictions were designed for accused persons and in response
to wrongful convictions. These reforms have the potential to assist all witnesses
with mental disabilities in receiving equal treatment in the criminal justice system.
178. R v TA, [2003] NSWCCA 191 at para 8, Spigelman CJ concurring.
179. Plotnikoff & Woolfson, supra note 138 at 55.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is time for Canada to take a serious look at what can be done to improve access
to justice for witnesses with mental disabilities, as other common law countries
with a commitment to fair trial rights for the accused have done in recent years.
Reforms should include the use of intermediaries, provisions that require judges
to disallow improper questions, and the continuing education of all participants
in the criminal justice system to increase their ability to treat witnesses with mental
disabilities equally and fairly.
While these reforms could benefit any witness, our focus in this article is on
the particular importance of this issue for complainants in sexual assault trials,
most of whom are women. We know that these women experience high rates of
sexual assault and that they are less likely to see their cases prosecuted. They face
barriers and stereotypes, including a system for the oral testimony of witnesses
through examination-in-chief and cross-examination that often fails to take into
account their realities. Since the complainant’s evidence is usually essential to a
conviction, it is particularly important that we ensure a trial process that is truly
fair and encourages the search for truth.

